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Introduction 
§ everal participants in the conference on computer network attack held at 
the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in June 1999 ad-
dressed the issue of whether serious consideration should be given in the near fu-
ture to negotiating international agreements to regulate information warfare. 
The consensus appeared to be that it would be useful to expand current efforts to 
improve international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer 
crimes and "cyber-terrorism," but that it would be premature anytime in the 
near future to attempt any further prohibition or regulation of State action in the 
broad area of information warfare. I generally share those views. This chapter 
will discuss a number of possibilities for international agreements on informa-
tion warfare, indicate the eJl..1:ent of declared support for negotiations intended to 
produce such agreements, and venture an opinion on their potential utility. 
Some observers have said that the few calls already heard for a treaty banning 
information warfare come primarily from "have-not" nations that fervendy de-
sire to keep the "haves" from reaping any advantage from the information war-
fare capabilities they have developed by their effort and investment. Others say 
that new agreements are necessary to enhance the international cooperation that 
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is essential to effective suppression of malicious interference with information 
systems that are essential to development, prosperity, international peace and se-
curity, and human health and safety. Still others say that new information tech-
nologies raise novel international legal issues that would be better resolved by 
negotiating a definitive international agreement than through the slow and un-
certain process by which customary international law develops. Others reply 
that we are not yet smart enough to sit down and create international law on 
these new issues, and that the gradual accumulation of practice and precedent of-
fers the best process for applying existing international law to these new issues in 
cyberspace. I boldly take the position that each of these views is correct-in part 
and on some subjects. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I intend to set aside discussion of a number of 
military missions that are often considered to be elements of information war-
fare. These are the physical destruction of information systems by traditional 
military means, electronic warfare (e.g., 'Jamming" of radio and radar signals), 
military deception, and operations security. These traditional military missions 
have been conducted for a long time over a wide spectrum of military operations 
from peace to war, and the application of international law to them is reasonably 
well settled. I also intend to set aside discussion of directed energy weapons such 
as high-energy radio, microwave, and electro-magnetic pulse devices. The 
technology of these devices is relatively new, but their employment and effects 
are likely to be so similar to those of traditional weapons that established princi-
ples of international law concerning the use of force and the law of armed con-
flict can be applied to them with great confidence. 
Psychological operations have also been a traditional military mission, but 
new technologies such as the broadcasting of radio and television signals from 
aircraft and satellites, worldwide access to the Internet, and greatly improved ca-
pabilities to create false images and messages give "psyops" unprecedented reach 
and power . .fu we shall see, there already have been a few isolated calls for new 
international controls over these new capabilities for spreading "propaganda." 
The newest element of information warfare, and the one currently dra\ving 
the most attention, is computer network attack, or CNA. CNA is conducted by 
sending electronic messages from one computer to another through some con-
necting medium or network, such as radio or the Internet, or by direct input 
by a user of the target computer system. The most common forms ofCNA are: 
(1) overloading an adversary's web pages or e-mail systems \vith so much input 
that they cannot function properly; (2) tricking an authorized user into inputting 
malicious logic, as by sending an e-mail message with a virus or a worm in an at-
tached file; and (3) obtaining unauthorized access to an adversary's computer 
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system. Unauthorized access may be obtained by exploiting a security weakness 
in the target's operating system, by unauthorized use of a genuine user identifi-
cation and password, or by other means. Even if an intruder does no apparent 
harm, the mere fact that an intruder has gained unauthorized access renders the 
system and its contents suspect, since an intruder could have altered stored data, 
changed the operating system, or introduced malicious logic such as a virus, 
worm, or logic bomb. An intruder may even damage the system to the point 
where it becomes unusable. The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily 
on the question of whether it would be desirable to negotiate international 
agreements to prohibit or regulate CNA. 
At this point in history, there are a number of "revealed truths" concerning 
CNA that make it different from prior methods and means of conducting hostil-
ities. I list them here as common points of departure; the reader can find a fuller 
discussion of them in the other contributions to this volume: 
• The more a nation relies on sophisticated information systems, the more 
vulnerable it is to interference with them; 
• Geography has ceased to be relevant to the security of information systems 
that are connected to the Internet or that are accessible by radio; 
• The worldwide use of comparable equipment, operating systems, and 
software greatly facilitates CNA; 
• Information technologies change rapidly; 
• Most advances in information technology are developed by individuals or 
companies for commercial purposes; 
• Developing at least some capability to interfere with other nations' 
information systems is relatively cheap and easy, compared to other 
modem weapons systems, and the necessary expertise and equipment are 
widely available; 
• CNA "offense" currently seems to be dominant over CNA "defense," but 
the balance between them might change quickly and dramatically; 
• In most cases it is difficult to locate and identify computer intruders, to 
discover their motive and intent, and to determine whether their acts are 
attributable to State sponsors; and 
• Because many "dual-use" information infrastructures whose support to 
military operations makes them legitimate military targets are also used for 
noncombatant purposes, interference with them may endanger the safety 
of persons and property protected by the law of war from deliberate attack 
and from disproportionate collateral damage. 
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Calls For International Agreements 
Public calls by governments for new international agreements on information 
warfare consist primarily of: (1) initiatives by the United States and by certain 
European and other American nations to promote better international coopera-
tion in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes and terrorism; and (2) a 
campaign by Russia in United Nations channels for multilateral arms control 
negotiations to protect international "information security." 
International cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes 
has sometimes proven to be quite effective even in the absence of new agree-
ments and working arrangements specifically tailored to this new category of of-
fenses. For example, in 1987 West German authorities relied on the authority 
provided by existing German law to trace the origin of over 200 intrusions into 
US government computers to four German nationals who turned out to be 
working for the KGB.l In far too many cases, however, effective international 
cooperation in investigating computer offenses has been frustrated by the un-
willingness of the requested State to cooperate, its lack of domestic legal author-
ity to investigate and punish computer offenses, the absence of established 
procedures and points of contact, and problems arising from extradition treaties. 
In an effort to address such problems, in December 1997 the United States Attor-
ney General hosted a meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) Justice and Interior 
Ministers to discuss international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution 
of computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes.2 Since this meeting, a number 
of international working groups have devoted considerable effort to modernizing 
the G-8 nations' domestic criminal laws and to improving international agreements 
and arrangements providing for mutual legal assistance and e}"1:radition in cases in-
volving computer offenses. This work has also generated a project in the Council of 
Europe, which the United States has assisted, to draft an international convention on 
"cyber-crime." The United States has also undertaken similar initiatives in the Or-
ganization of American States and at the United Nations. Significant progress has 
been made, but there is still an enormous amount of work to be done in this area. 
For example, while several European nations have made significant reforms in their 
domestic computer crime laws and the state of procedures for international assis-
tance in investigating computer offenses has gready improved between various na-
tions, Russia has essentially stonewalled all requests for cooperation in investigating 
several thousand intrusions into US military computer systems in early 1999 that ap-
parendy originated in Russian territory.3 
In addition, these efforts have focused on computer offenses committed by 
individuals that can be characterized as crimes or terrorism. They are not direcdy 
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relevant to State action. Somewhat ironically, the only nation that has made a 
prominent effort to address the use of computer network attack by States against 
other States has been Russia. In October 1998, Russian Federation Ambassador 
Vasily Sidorovmade a statement before the UN General Assembly's Committee 
on Disarmament and International Security to the effect that Russia is alarmed 
by the serious threats to international peace and security raised by developments 
in information technology, and that it is urgent to take preventive measures by 
establishing international principles on the use of information technology and 
possibly an international monitoring and control regime.4 Russia also tabled a 
resolution that called for Member States to ex-press their views on the creation of 
"international legal regimes to prohibit the development, production or use of 
particularly dangerous forms ofinformation weapons" and the establishment of 
"an international system (centre) for monitoring threats pertaining to the secu-
rity of global information and telecommunications systems."5 
No significant support was expressed by other nations for the Russian pro-
posal. Instead, on December 4, 1998, the General Assembly adopted without a 
vote a greatly watered-down resolution that called on Member States to "pro-
mote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in 
the field of information security," invited all Member States to inform the Secretary 
General of their views on the subject, requested the Secretary-General to sub-
mit a report to the General Assembly in its 1999 session, and included in the 
provisional agenda for its next session the topic, "Developments in the field of 
information and telecommunications in the context of international security."6 
Undeterred, Russia has continued to pursue its proposal for an "international 
legal regime" on "information weapons." In its submission of views to the Sec-
retary General as invited by the General Assembly resolution, Russia declared 
that "information weapons" can have" devastating consequences comparable to 
the effect of weapons of mass destruction," called for the General Assembly to 
pass "resolutions on the question ofinfomi.ation security with a view to reduc-
ing the threat of the use of information for terrorist, criminal or military pur-
poses," and proposed the development of a code of conduct for States 
concerning international information security that would ultimately be incor-
porated into a multilateral international legal instrument? 
The United States also submitted its views, which generally were that the in-
ternational community should give priority to developing measures to deal with 
criminal or terrorist misuse of information technology, and that "it would be 
premature to try to formulate overarching principles pertaining to information 
security in all its aspects."8 
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Only eight other nations-Australia, Belarus, Brunei, Cuba, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom-submitted written views to the Secre-
tary General. Of these, only Belarus and Cuba expressed support for negotia-
tions to restrict information warfare. The Secretary General offered no opinion. 
In August 1999, the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs and 
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) hosted a 
conference in Geneva, Switzerland on the topic: "Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications and Their Impact on International Secu-
rity." Russia used the forum to promote its proposals for international legal re-
strictions on information warfare, but it was unable to gamer significant support 
for doing more than continuing to study the problem.9 
Nevertheless, the current paucity of enthusiasm for negotiating an interna-
tional agreement restricting information warfare may not last forever. In the past 
twenty years, the international community has negotiated multilateral treaties 
restricting such weapons as chemical weapons, blinding lasers, incendiaries, 
weapons designed to wound with undetectable fragments, and antipersonnel 
landmines.10 It might take only a few spectacular incidents involving CNA to 
provoke serious interest in placing international legal restrictions upon "infor-
mation weapons." 
Subjects For Possible Agreements 
Treaties to suppress private misconduct. 
1. Suppression of "cyber-crime." As indicated above, efforts are already under 
way in the G-8, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, 
and the United Nations to improve domestic criminal legislation, international 
cooperation in investigations and prosecutions, and extradition treaties in order 
to more effectively investigate and punish cross-border computer crimes. The 
US and British submissions of views' mentioned above recommended that the 
United Nations give this area top priority in its activities concerning information 
security. 
ASSESSMENT: This topic is a logical candidate for priority consideration, 
since both the nature of the problem of cross-border computer crime and the re-
quired remedial steps are reasonably well understood, and since national security 
issues are not directly implicated. (It should be noted, however, that effective in-
ternational cooperation in tracing computer network attacks to their origin 
would also greatly expedite attribution of State-sponsored CNA.) That is not to 
say that the negotiation of the necessary international agreements will be easy, 
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given the major differences that exist among domestic legal systems and the en-
croachment on traditional sovereignty principles that will be inescapable in cre-
ating legally binding obligations to assist with criminal investigations and 
prosecutions, not to mention the proposals that are under consideration for re-
ciprocal authorization of cross-border electronic tracing and monitoring. 
2. Suppression of "cyber-terrorism." A "cyber-terrorism" agreement might well 
adopt the common features of the existing multilateral treaties intended to com-
bat such terrorist acts as the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, hostage taking, at-
tacks on diplomats, terrorist bombing, and the seizure of ships on the high seas.11 
These common features are a recognition of universal or quasi-universal juris-
diction over individuals committing specified acts, an obligation upon each 
Party to put into place severe domestic criminal penalties for such acts, and an 
obligation to prosecute or extradite any person suspected of such acts who is 
found in the territory of a Party. 
ASSESSMENT: It may prove to be difficult to generate much interest in nego-
tiating such an agreement until the international community experiences inci-
dents in which "cyber-terrorism" causes death and destruction on the scale 
experienced as the result of more traditional forms of terrorism. To date, the most 
common form of cross-border CNA motivated by political reasons has consisted 
of individuals defacing the target nation's websites, which is likely to strike most 
people more as vandalism than as terrorism. Even the theft oflarge amounts of 
money or the crippling of expensive information systems is unlikely to provoke 
the same kind offear and loathing created by more traditional terrorist acts that di-
recdy threaten innocent human lives. It would probably take an incident in which 
planes crash, trains collide, floods cause death and devastation, or a nuclear acci-
dent spreads radiation over the countryside before CNA would be taken seriously 
as "cyber-terrorism." Another major problem would be reaching agreement on 
definitions of the acts to be suppressed. It is certainly worth exploring the possibili-
ties here, but rapid progress-or even moving the international community at 
large to devote serious effort to negotiation of a "cyber-terrorism" treaty--seems 
unlikely in the near future. It may turn out that the most effective legal mechanism 
for suppression of "cyber-terrorists" will be "cyber-crime" agreements, as dis-
cussed above, that would put into effect domestic computer crime laws and facili-
tate cross-border investigations and prosecutions. 
Treaties to restrict state action. 
1. Declarations of general legal principles. Perhaps the simplest approach to ad-
vancing the development of international law on information security would be 
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to negotiate a multilateral treaty that declares broad relevant principles of inter-
national law. An example of such a document is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,12 
which declares, inter alia, that space is not subject to national appropriation or 
territorial claims, that nations are obligated not to interfere with the space activi-
ties of other nations, that space objects remain under the jurisdiction and control 
of their nation of registry, that nations bear international responsibility for their 
space activities, and that established principles ofinternationallaw, including the 
UN Charter, apply to space activities. Some candidate principles for a similar 
declaration of principles on information activities might be that nations must not 
damage/disrupt/interfere with the information systems of other nations; that 
such acts violate the sovereignty of the victim nation and threaten international 
peace and security; and perhaps even that interference ,vith information systems 
causing death, injury, widespread property damage, or serious damage to com-
munications, public utilities, economic institutions, emergency services, or na-
tional security systems will be considered to be equivalent to an armed attack, 
thereby authorizing the victim nation to employ the remedies provided under 
international law to the victims of traditional armed attacks, including the use of 
force in individual or collective self-defense. 
ASSESSMENT: It will take some time for most nations to determine what 
international legal principles concerning information warfare are likely to best 
serve their long-term national interests. Even nations that already possess sophis-
ticated information systems have litde confidence at this point that they can reli-
ably forecast near-term technical developments that may drastically affect the 
balance of information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities. Those nations 
that have even a minimum of capabilities to engage in information operations 
must make a judgment as to whether their interests would be best served by 
keeping open their options to interfere with other nation's information systems, 
especially when they are engaged in an international armed conflict, or whether 
their national interests would be best served by creating an international legal re-
gime that broadly prohibits such interference. 
The current domestic and international debate over "space control" may 
present a useful analogy. As indicated above, the Outer Space Treaty declares the 
general principle that nations will not interfere with the space activities of other 
nations. However, its provisions recognizing that nations must conduct their 
space activities in compliance with international law , including the UN Charter, 
bring to bear the international law principles that force can be used in 
self-defense and to execute mandates of the Security Council. Accordingly, 
these widely-recognized legal authorizations for the use of force apply to space 
activities in the same manner as they do in the air, at sea, and on land. 
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Furthennore, since the Outer Space Treaty is silent as to its application during an 
international anned conflict, we are left to rely on the general principles of inter-
national law to detennine the extent to which its obligations may apply in war-
time. 13 In these circumstances, there has been considerable activity in the UN 
General Assembly and in the Conference on Disannament devoted to drafting a 
multilateral agreement to prevent an "arms race in space." To date, however, 
this activity has produced virtually nothing in the way of concrete results.14 
The continuing impasse over attempts to develop international legal measures 
to prevent an "arms race in space" might be seen as a confrontation of the "haves" 
versus the "have-nots," which might also be seen as the dynamic at work in the 
impasse over proposals for complete nuclear disannament. On the other hand, 
the impasse might also be seen as reflecting the reluctance of at least some of the 
thirty or so space-capable nations to participate in fonnulating intemationallegal 
principles concerning space control when they have yet to reach their own 
judgments concerning where their own long-tenn national interests lie. 
The analogy between space control and infonnation warfare is less than exact, 
for several reasons. One is the fact that it is many orders of magnitude easier for a 
nation to develop a significant infonnation warfare capability than it is to de-
velop space control capabilities. This is clearly demonstrated by the computer 
network attacks that have already been reported in connection with such con-
flicts as Kosovo and Chechnya, and in the continuing tensions between Taiwan 
and mainland China.1s The converse is also true--virtually every nation em-
ploys at least some automated infonnation systems, making them vulnerable to 
CNA, while only about thirty nations conduct space activities. In these circum-
stances, it seems unlikely that very many nations will regard -themselves as 
"non-players" in infonnation warfare. It seems equally unlikely that many of 
them will come to finn conclusions anytime soon about how their own 
long-tenn national interests might be affected by restricting CNA or other in-
fonnation warfare activities. Accordingly, even a declaration of general legal 
principles concerning infonnation warfare is likely to be beyond the grasp of the 
international community for the foreseeable future. 
2. Anlls Control Agreements. Another approach would be to negotiate agree-
ments under which the parties would commit themselves not to develop, possess, 
or transfer certain information warfare capabilities, or to use them in a manner that 
is destabilizing to other arms control regimes or to crisis management systems. 
ASSESSMENT: This approach is subject to the same caveat stated above, 
which is that not many nations-if any-have figured out where their 
long-tenn national interest lies in relation to infonnation warfare. It also suffers 
from the great difficulty of defining exacdy what capabilities the parties would 
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agree not to develop, possess, or transfer; from the apparent impossibility of 
verification; from the €lct that governments have no monopoly over the develop-
ment or use ofCNA capabilities; and from the fact that CNA capabilities and vul-
nerabilities change rapidly. The development of "hacking" tools is a worldwide 
cottage industry, unlike nuclear weapons, tanks, artillery, submarines, ballistic 
missiles, or warplanes. Powerful hacker tools are posted on the Internet for use by 
all comers.16 Furthermore, many highly capable computer network attack capa-
bilities spring direcdy from techniques and programs developed for legitimate 
purposes.17 For these reasons, it is difficult to envisage how an arms control-style 
agreement could be negotiated anytime in the near future. In addition, any pro-
posal for a nonproliferation agreement might well raise suspicions among the 
developing nations that the "have" nations are engaged in a conspiracy to deny 
the developing nations the benefits of highly capable information systems. 
Strategic arms control agreements often contain provisions to preserve or ex-
pand transparency, such as obligations not to interfere with other parties' na-
tional technical means of verification. It may not be necessary to negotiate 
separate agreements in order to extend the reach of such agreements to ban elec-
tronic means of interference with national technical means of verification. At 
most, an agreed interpretation by the parties should suffice. Another similar ex-
tension of arms control principles that might prove to be both useful and attain-
able would be an agreement that the parties will not employ information warfare 
techniques in a manner that would interfere with each others' command and 
control of strategic weapons or disrupt missile attack warning systems. 
Another theme of arms control agreements has been to create new confi-
dence-building procedures, as in the Open Skies Agreement. iS However, it is 
difficult to imagine how a confidence-building agreement could be devised for 
computer network attack capabilities, since such an agreement would entail 
widespread access by each party to the national computer systems of other parties 
that would be exceptionally intrusive without holding out much promise of 
effectiveness. 
In 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to conduct dan-
gerous military activities in peacetime in proximity to the military forces of the 
other party.19 One of the activities in which the parties agreed not to engage is 
interference with command and control networks in a manner which could 
cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the other party. Since elec-
tronic interference was already the primary mechanism causing interference 
with command and control networks, it would appear that this agreement can 
be applied to CNA without change. Whether circumstances will make it appro-
priate to enter into similar agreements with other nations remains to be seen. 
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3. LAw cifWar Agreements. Existing law of war treaties ban the use in interna-
tional armed conflicts of weapons such as expanding bullets, barbed weapons, 
and projectiles filled with glass on the basis that, used as intended, they are likely 
to cause unnecessary suffering.2o The methods and means of information war-
fare do not generally raise such considerations, since few information warfare 
techniques cause any direct personal injury or impairment to health. An odd and 
isolated exception is a report by Russian authorities that they have discovered a 
computer virus called "666" that displays certain light patterns on a computer 
screen that cause the operator to lapse into a coma. Fifty computer operators are 
reported to have died as a result of exposure to the "666" virus.21 With this bi-
zarre exception, information warfare "weapons" are not generally understood 
to cause unnecessary suffering in the same way as do weapons that have been 
banned for this reason. 
The law of war also bans the use in international armed conflict of weapons 
that are indiscriminate, i.e., they cannot be controlled and directed only against 
authorized military targets. Poison gas and non-self-destructinglnon-self-disabling 
antipersonnellandmines are examples of weapons that have been banned for this 
reason.22 We have already seen self-propagating computer "viruses" and 
"worms" that clearly foreshadow the issue of malicious logic that runs amok 
through military and civilian computer systems. Again, however, malicious 
computer logic is unlikely to direcdy cause injury and death. Furthermore, any 
attempt at drafting an international agreement that would ban indiscriminate in-
formation warfare "weapons" is likely to founder on the difficulty of defining 
them. It seems unlikely that any resulting agreement would advance interna-
tionallaw beyond the principle that "information weapons," like all weapons, 
must be discriminate. 
Law of war agreements have also taJs:en the tack of banning or restricting 
attacks on certain targets, such as medical facilities, prisoner of war camps, and 
cultural property.23 These existing agreements already protect these facilities 
from attack by any means, including information warfare techniques. It might 
be argued that infrastructures that are heavily relied upon for the health and 
safety of the civilian populations and that are particularly vulnerable to CNA 
should be specifically protected from such attack by international agreement. 
Examples might be public utilities, transportation, communications, financial 
networks, emergency services, and universities. The problem is that such sys-
tems may in certain circumstances be legitimate targets of attack. This may be 
the case when the system is being used to provide direct support to military 
operations, as when a single electric power net is used both for military and 
civilian purposes. It may also be the case, in a long and protracted conflict, 
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that a belligerent's transportation, utilities, financial system, and research and 
development systems become valid military targets because disrupting them 
would significandy undermine its military strength. Accordingly, it seems un-
likely that the nations would agree to bestow blanket immunity on such sys-
tems, or that an international agreement could be negotiated that would 
advance law of war principles on the targeting of dual-use infrastructures be-
yond their current state. Furthermore, it would be highly counterproductive 
to ban CNA against such infrastructures while leaving them open to attack by 
traditional military weapons, which would in most cases create a much greater 
danger of collateral damage. 
Finally, one theme of the Russian initiative for a ban on "especially dangerous 
information weapons" has been a push for limitations on psychological warfare. 
The Russian statement submitted to the Secretary General inJune 1999 referred 
to the threat of"(u)se of information with a view to undermining a State's politi-
cal and social system; psychological manipulation of a population for the purpose 
of destabilizing society."24 The Cuban submission also addressed this issue: 
"The misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information 
resources, especially when such systems and resources are used by some States to 
carry out their policies ofinterference in the affairs of other States, is an infringe-
ment of the sovereignty and independence of the affected States and creates cen-
tres of tension that may pose a serious threat to international security. "25 From 
past experience, it seems highly unlikely that the international community ,vill 
be eager to create broad restrictions on propaganda, even as it has been empow-
ered by new and more powerful information technologies. Russia, Cuba, and 
other States stung in the past by the Voice of America, Radio Marti, and other 
"voices offreedom" will no doubt continue to beat this drum. It seems particu-
larly unlikely that any of the Western democracies will support such calls to im-
pose international, legal restraints on the criticism of other societies or 
governments. As the authors of a recent article in Foreign Affairs concluded, 
"Their societies are familiar with the free exchange of information, and their in-
stitutions of governance are not threatened by it. "26 
Forms Of Possible Agreements 
A. Multilateral Conventions. Multilateral conventions, especially those to 
which substantially all nations become parties, carry the greatest weight of 
authority in establishing new international law. It seems extremely unlikely, 
however, that a multilateral convention restricting State action relating to 
information warfare will be adopted anytime soon. As stated above, few nations 
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have eJl.."Pressed any interest in negotiating such an agreement, chiefly because 
few nations understand information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities well 
enough to determine what principles of international law would best serve their 
long-term national interests. 
In addition, the fundamental unhappiness felt by many nations as the result of 
recent eJl.."Periences in diplomatic conferences is likely to generate significant 
procedural controversies that would have to be settled before negotiating new 
multilateral conventions. There are essentially two procedural approaches to the 
negotiation of a multilateral convention, whether through UN channels or in a 
special diplomatic conference. The first is a consensus procedure, which is used 
in such fora as the Conference on Disarmament. This procedure requires 
achieving general acceptance of a negotiating text, usually by a process of tough 
bargaining and compromise. 
A recent alternative approach to negotiating multilateral conventions has 
been the use of majority-rule procedures, which were in essence the proce-
dures used in the negotiations in Oslo that produced the Ottawa Convention 
banning antipersonnellandmines and in the Rome Conference that produced 
the draft Statute of the International Criminal Court. The great practical ad-
vantage and also the worst defect of such procedures is that they allow the ma-
jority of participating nations to approve a treaty text to which minority 
nations have fundamental objections. Such a result affords the organizers of 
the negotiations and the members of the majority immediate gratification, but 
it produces a treaty that will probably not be accepted by the dissenting States. 
In the case of the Ottawa Convention, this process generated a treaty which is 
almost meaningless because it apparently will not be ratified by a number of 
countries whose military forces and operations are most important to world 
affairs, including the United States, Russia, and China. The same is true to a 
somewhat lesser extent for the draft Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Ironically, there were opportunities in the negotiations that produced 
both of these conventions to arrive at compromises that would have made 
them more widely acceptable. In both cases, however, the "like-minded" 
groups were not required to agree to these compromises to produce an agree-
ment, and in both they chose ideological purity over wider acceptance. With 
these recent debacles in mind, it seems unlikely that there will be much en-
thusiasm in the near future for convening any major new international law-
making diplomatic conferences on any subject. 
B. Bilateral Agreements. Bilateral agreements, or agreements among a small 
number of nations, are most useful when only a few governments are directly 
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involved in the issues to be addressed. This may be because the issues are limited 
to one geographic area, or because only a few nations are capable of engaging in 
the activities in question. Good examples of the latter group are strategic nuclear 
arms control agreements and agreements to limit anti-ballistic and theater missile 
defense systems. Agreements to promote better suppression of cybercrime and 
cyberterrorism could be negotiated either multilaterally or bilaterally. The 
results of the current efforts described above in the G-8, the Council of Europe, 
and the Organization of American States are likely to be a combination of both, 
with regional agreements arrived at on some issues, and bilateral approaches 
taken to others. Negotiation of a global multilateral convention on these issues is 
unlikely until the problems of cybercrime and cyberterrorism are more broadly 
experienced and more broadly understood. 
C. General Assembly Resolutions. The United Nations General Assembly 
has displayed great enthusiasm for passing resolutions on a broad range of sub-
jects calling on Member States to adhere to certain principles. When such reso-
lutions enjoy broad support they may persuasively influence the policies of 
member governments and international institutions, but such resolutions do 
not generally have the force of international law. On the other hand, there are 
occasional General Assembly resolutions that are eA-pressly intended to declare 
certain principles of customary international law. When such resolutions are 
supported by all or substantially all Members, they may be given great weight as 
evidence of customary international law. An example of such a resolution rec-
ognized as "law-declarative" by the United States is the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.27 
Judging from the lack of interest generated by the Russian initiatives on "infor-
mation security" in the General Assembly, it seems unlikely that there will be 
enough support to pass any kind of resolution calling on Member States to ob-
serve any set of principles concerning information warfare. Given the novelty 
of the international legal issues involved, it seems even more unlikely that the 
General Assembly will pass a "law-declarative" resolution on information war-
fare in the next several decades. 
D. "Codification" of Existing Customary International Law. Several 
participants in the Newport conference recalled the work of the round-tables of 
governmental and academic experts that met periodically from 1988 to 1994, 
hosted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which ultimately 
produced the San Remo Manual on International LAw Applicable to Amled Conflicts at 
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Sea. The San Remo Manual is widely recognized as an authoritative restatement 
of the consensus understanding among the world's leading governmental and 
academic experts in this branch of international law, and it will no doubt be 
accorded great weight as evidence of the interpretation of applicable treaties and 
the state of customary international law. However, there would appear to be 
little potential in the foreseeable future for successfully employing an "experts 
conference" to authoritatively record the customary international law governing 
information warfare. At present there is no such law, which can only accumulate 
from State practice in reaction to events as they unfold 'over time. Accordingly, 
there are no "experts" either, since there is no accumulation of State practice that 
learned commentators could analyze and restate. 
Conclusions 
The ne},."t few years are likely to produce a number of regional and bilateral 
agreements designed to improve international cooperation in battling 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism. If dramatic events occur involving 
cyberterrorism, or if the international community feels the necessity to do some-
thi/lg in the area of computer network attacks, a multilateral convention on sup-
pression of cyberterrorism may result. The parties to strategic arms control 
treaties may find it useful to state their common understanding concerning how 
their provisions apply to CNA directed against national technical means of veri-
fication, command and control systems, and attack warning systems. 
However, there seems to be little or no prospect of negotiating international 
agreements that would broadly prohibit or regulate state action involving infor-
mation warfare techniques because: (1) the issues involved are not yet well un-
derstood; (2) traditional arms control and law of war mechanisms are not well 
suited for application to CNA; and (3) the nations-including the United 
States-do not yet have a clear understanding of what kind of international legal 
regime relating to information warfare would best serve their long-term na-
tional interests. For the foreseeable future, the development of international law 
concerning information warfare is most likely to consist of the incremental ac-
cumulation of customary international law resulting from the actions and state-
ments of nations in response to events as they unfold. Considering the 
circumstances, that is probably the best available process. During this formative 
period, statesmen and their advisers will have a heavy responsibility to bear in 
mind that their acts and statements will playa major role in the development of 
international law concerning information warfare. 
453 
Is It Time for a Treaty on Information Warfare? 
Notes 
1. CLIFF STOLL, THE COOKOO'S EGG (1989). 
2. u.S. Dep'tJustice Press Release, Statement by Attorney GeneralJanet Reno on the Meeting 
ofJustice and Interior Ministers of the Group ofEight, Dec. 10, 1997. The members of the G-8 are 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3.Jim Wolf, Moscow Said to Withhold Full Help on Crber-Blitz, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 1999. 
4. Daniel Verton, DoD Faces lnfowar COlltrols, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK, Jan. 11, 
1999. 
5. Russian Federation, draft resolution, Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/53/L.17 
(1999). 
6. G.A. Res. 53/70, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/70 (1999). 
7. Report of the Secretary General on developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security, U.N. Doc. A/541213 (1999), at 8. 
8. ld. at 11. 
9. Discussion Summary, Developments in the Field ofInformation and Telecommunications 
in the Context ofInternational Security (private Discussion Meeting Hosted by the Department of 
Disarmament Affuirs and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Aug. 25-26, 
1999). 
10. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 
1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-25 (1993) [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention]; 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 103-21 
(1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]; Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 
Sept. 18, 1997,36 LL.M. 1507 (1997) [This agreement has not been signed by the United 
States]. 
11. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other ActS Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 
1963, 20 U.S. T. 2941, 704 U.N. T .S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; 
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against 
Persons and Related Extortion that are ofInternational Significance, Oct. 16, 1973,27 U.S.T. 
3949; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1974, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Oct. 26, 1979, 
T.LA.S. 11080; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 
T.LA.S. 11081; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24,1988, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 100-19 (1988); Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 
1988,27 LL.M. 668 (1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 LL.M. 685 (1988); 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Nov. 25,1997,37 LL.M. 
249 (1998). 
12. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the El-.:ploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
454 
Phillip A. Johnson 
13. See Office Of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment OfIntemational 
Legal Issues In Information Operations, sect. I.B (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter DoD/GC Paper]. This 
paper is appended to this volume as the appendix. 
14. ld. 
15. See, e.g., Nerd World War, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1999 (LEXIS); Robyn Dixon, Chechyns 
Use Net ill Publicity War with Russia, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A-4; David A. 
Fulghum, Telecom Lillks Provide Cyber-Attack Route, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 
Nov. 8, 1999, at 81; Bob Brewin, Kosovo Ushered ill Cybenvar, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK, Sept. 
27,1999. 
16. MichaelE. Ruane, New Computer Tec1l11ology Makes Hackillg a SlIap, WASHINGTON POST, 
Mar. 10, 1999, at 1. 
17. Donn Parker, Automated Sealrity, INFORMATION SECURITY, Oct. 1999, at 32. 
18. Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24,1992, S. TREATY Doc No. 102-37 (1992). The United 
States has ratified this agreement but it has not come into force. 
19. Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989,28 I.L.M. 
877 (1989). 
20. Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs ofW ar on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277; Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 10. 
21. Timothy L. Thomas, Dialectical Versus Empirical T1lillkillg: Tell Key Elemellts of the Russiall 
Ullderstalldillg ofllifonllatioll Operatiolls,JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES, Mar. 1998, at 
51. 
22. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods ofWarfure, June 17, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571, 94 
U.N.T.S. 65; Chelnical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, Conventional Weapons 
Convention, Sf/pra note 10. 
23. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S. T. 3114, 75 U.N. T.S. 31; Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,1954,249 U.N.T.S. 240. The 
United States has signed but has not ratified this agreement. 
24. Secretary General's Report, supra note 7, at 9. 
25. ld. at 5. 
26. Robert O. Keohane andJoseph S. Nye,Jr., Power alld lllterdepelldeuce ill the lllfonuatioll Age, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Qct. 1998, at 93. 
27. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. Al8082 (1970). See DoD/GC Paper, 
sect. III. A, supra note 13. 
455 
